Since the early-2000s, the share of revenue going to Major League Baseball players has been diminishing similar to the decline of labor's share of revenue observed in the US economy. This study examines potential explanations for the decline in baseball, which may result from related factors and provide information relevant to explaining this macroeconomic trend. The results indicate that the value-added from non-player inputs, collective bargaining agreement terms, and related changes in the returns to winning contributed to the decline of players' share of income. Competition from substitute foreign labor and physical capital are not associated with the decline in labor's share of income in baseball.
Introduction
The introduction of free agency in Major League Baseball (MLB) in 1976 eliminated the "reserve clause" that restricted player compensation, and thus MLB players' share of League revenue greatly expanded. But after the initial increase, the players' share has fluctuated. Following findings of owner collusion during the 1980s, players saw a dramatic rise in their share of revenue in the 1990s before experiencing a general decline in the early-2000s to the present. This recent decline is a curiosity given the observed stability of labor's share of income in the overall economy until recently.
Labor's share of income has long been viewed as a near constant by economists; however, like it has in baseball, workers' share of income aggregated across all industries has been falling since the beginning of the 21 st century, which has prompted economists to search for explanations. The complex economy makes identifying the contributions among many factors to this sudden decline difficult. While several hypotheses propose explanations for the declining share of labor, none have been able to provide a complete explanation.
Revenue and compensation data from MLB provide an opportunity to examine changes in labor's revenue share in a controlled environment. MLB's output is entertainment, which is highly valued by consumers, and its revenue has grown monotonically, with an average annual growth rate of 7.5 percent since 1990. As a spectator sport, its product is labor-intensive, which limits the extent to which capital can substitute for labor to a greater degree than most industries. Thus, an analysis of the decline of MLB's labor share may aid in understanding the potential causes of the economy-wide decline in labor's share by examining an industry that has experienced a similar decline despite minimal labor-capital substitution, increased importation of labor, and is unionized.
Section 2 presents stylized facts regarding labor's declining share in MLB and the economy and posits potential explanations. Section 3 investigates the hypotheses empirically. Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the findings. The analysis indicates the that changes to the returns to winning, which were influenced through collectively-bargained rules, and the emergence of profitable technology-driven nonplayer inputs provide the best explanations for the decline in players' share of revenue. The substitution of foreign labor or changes in the return to stadium capital do not appear related to the share of income going to labor. a product of service time on a roster, and thus excluding players for whom salary information is unavailable may bias the labor share downwards. The number of players with unreported salaries in the sample did increase substantially from 21 percent in the 1990s to 36 percent in the 2000s; therefore, it is possible that the decline in labor's share is an artifact of teams' increased use of players without recorded salary.
Stylized Facts and Potential Explanations
To address the reporting issue, I develop an adjusted-measure of labor share that proxies for the wages of players whose salaries are not reported. For the most part, players added during the season are young marginal player who are paid a pro-rated share of the league-minimum salary-which ranged from $100,000 (1990) to $507,500 (2015) per season during the sample-for the days that they were on a MLB roster.
Identifying days on an MLB roster is difficult, because players on the roster do not always appear in games.
Therefore, I identified every MLB player who appeared as a hitter or a pitcher in each year who did not have a recorded salary, and I assigned these players the league-minimum salary for that year when calculating labor's share of MLB revenue. This method overstates the level of compensation paid; however, the positive bias of this correction ensures that the reduction in the labor share is not an artifact of teams using more players with unreported salaries.
The reported and league-minimum-corrected salary shares in Figure 1 show the two estimates track closely together, with the league-minimum-corrected salary shares being slightly above the uncorrected salary shares.
Though there does not appear to be any bias in reporting that could make the players' share appear to be declining, I use the corrected share for the remainder of the analysis to remove this potential bias. It is important to note that the players' share does not cover all of labor's share of the baseball industry, as it does not include the compensation of non-players (front office management, coaches, medical personnel, gameday and facility operations staff, etc.) or minor-league players who are paid by MLB franchises; thus, the macro-economic and MLB players' shares are not directly comparable. 1 However, changes in the players'
1 Comparisons to other North American professional sports leagues as a measure of labor's bargaining strength are also inappropriate, because they lack the extensive minor-league system that is funded almost entirely by MLB.
share heavily affects labor's overall share of income in MLB, and, because it is measurable over time, it is useful for the analysis. Fourth, the offshoring of labor has allowed US industries to substitute cheaper foreign workers for domestic labor, putting downward pressure on wages. Throughout much of its history, MLB teams have relied mostly on domestic players. During this period, baseball experienced an increased importation of labor, largely from Latin America and Asia, and foreign players now account from more than one quarter of MLB players. Thus, the increased supply of baseball talent offers another possible pathway for the reduction in the players' share of revenue.
Fifth, technological innovation allowing physical capital and non-player inputs to substitute for labor may have lowered the returns to labor throughout the economy. As a spectator sport, the capital-to-labor ratio has remained largely stable; however, changes in the value of non-labor inputs, such as stadiums and consumption through broadcast media may contribute to fluctuations in the returns to labor.
Empirical Analysis a. Changes in the Baseball Industry
I begin by examining changes in the baseball industry that have affected labor's share through the valuation of player contributions. The earliest studies of the economics of sports leagues have identified winning as the chief determinant of revenues for profit-maximizing teams. Fans desire to observe and be associated with successful teams, and thus teams that win more garner more consumers which increases revenue. Scully (1974) uses winning as the sole determinant of team revenues, and further studies (e.g., Scully (1989) , Krautmann (1999 ), Bradbury (2010 ) have done the same. Player marginal revenue products fluctuate with the returns to winning; therefore, changes in the value of winning ought to affect the share or revenue accruing to players.
Equation 1 presents the empirical model which was developed by Bradbury (2017) , which examines the determinants of revenue in the four major North American sports leagues and identifies the relevant factors for determining league revenue. The study finds that on-field success through winning and playoff participation, market size as measured by the population, and the age of the stadium are the main determinants of revenue for MLB teams.
(1) Revenueit = α + ФWinningit+ β1Populationit + β2Stadiumit + β2Yankeesit+ τTit + ε it + ν i
Revenue is the total revenue team i generates in year t, measured in 2015 dollars. 2 Revenue data were published in Financial World and Forbes and have previously been used in economic studies of sports leagues. 3
Winning is a vector of on-field success that contains three variables, run differential, run differential squared, and the lag of run differential. The run differential is highly correlated with winning and has the added advantage of further distinguishing between teams with similar winning percentages. 4
Population controls for the market size of the host city using the metropolitan statistical area population, which has been shown to be positively correlated with MLB team revenue. Stadium is the reciprocal of stadium age (year of observation -year of opening +1). The reciprocal transformation provides the best fit of the model and conforms to the theoretical strong-but-diminishing novelty effect of a new stadium.
Yankees controls for the unique revenue effects experienced by the New York Yankees that are not explained by the included explanatory variables. T is a vector of year effects, ε is a standard error term, and ν is a franchise-specific error term. All estimates are generated using the Baltagi and Wu (1999) random-effects estimator, which controls for identified serial correlation. 5 Table 1 lists the summary statistics.
To measure the change in the determinants of revenue over time, I estimate Equation 1 using four-year increments as well as a single specification for the entire sample. The four-year increments provide sufficient sample size variation for panel analysis and produce exactly six separate estimates over the sample, excluding the strike-shortened 1994 and 1995 seasons which are difficult to use in this comparison because revenue data derive from partial seasons. 6 Table 2 presents the results. The quadratic and lagged success variables make the interpretation of the raw coefficient estimates difficult; therefore, Figure 2 presents the estimates graphically by four-year increments and as a whole. 7
Figure 2. Returns to Wining in MLB by Era
The estimates show that the returns to winning are positive and increasing in all but one period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) make the case theoretically that the returns to winning ought to diminish, 6 Estimates using shorter and longer increments showed similar responses. 7 Estimates generated using the quadradic estimate of the current score differential in the present year and the discounted present value of score differential in the following year, based on the average revenue growth of the MLB. The one exception in this analysis (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) is consistent with findings presented in Solow and Krautmann (2007) , which uses different empirical methods to examine a similar time period and identifies diminishing returns to winning. One notable difference during this era was the existence of a "luxury tax" from 1997 to 1999 that required the top-five teams in payroll to pay a 35-percent (34 percent in 1999) tax on salary amounts above the mid-point of salaries between the fifth-and six-highest team payrolls. Unlike the version of this tax that was reintroduced in 2003-which included nominal salary thresholds so high that few teams approached and taxed overages at a mostly lower rate-the top-five payroll teams (which were successful in generating wins) faced this steep tax every year by decree, which necessarily reduced the returns of winning among the best teams in the league. Thus, the finding of diminishing returns is likely a product of this brief era and it institutions and not a product of consumer demand for competitive balance, as hypothesized by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale (1964) .
In general, it appears that the returns to winning are positive and increasing, a result that is also identified in basketball and hockey (Bradbury 2017 ). This finding is consistent with evidence that finds little effect of competitive balance the demand for sports (e.g., Berri, Schmidt, and Brook (2007) and Coates, Humphreys, and Zhou (2014) ).
Over time, the returns to winning declined relative to the early 1990s, reaching their lowest level in the 2004-2007 period, and then improving from 2008 to 2015. A decline in the returns to winning means that player marginal revenue products (after adjusting for league revenue growth) were declining, and thus labor's share should be expected to decline. Therefore, the reduction in the returns to winning may partially explain some of the decline of labor's share of revenue. These periods loosely correspond with collective bargaining agreements (CBA), which are examined explicitly in the following subsection.
b. Union Influence through Collective Bargaining MLB's relationship with its players and their union during the past four decades has been contentious at times-resulting in two major in-season labor strikes (1981 and 1994-1995) and findings of owner collusion in the latter-half of the 1980s-but the relationship has been mostly peaceful in reaching collective bargaining agreements without a work stoppage since 1995. Maxcy (2009) and Hill and Jolly (2017) find the revenue sharing components of particular CBAs, intended to improve competitive balance, affected player compensation, which would affect the players' share of revenue.
As poor teams receive revenue sharing when losing and successful teams must transfer additional revenue generated by further winning, the returns to winning decline. The CBAs involve complicated revenue-sharing plans with luxury taxes on high payroll teams (that are difficult to disentangle), thus the following descriptions revenue sharing arrangements in the CBAs are general. In summary, the evidence indicates a strong role for collective bargaining between the players' union and the owners in determining the players' share of revenue. However, not all of the changes in revenue can be attributed to changes in the CBA terms, as changes in the market value of winning (discussed in the preceding subsection) may have contributed. Table 2 , in four-year increments over the sample. The estimates reveal much stronger novelty effects early in the sample than in during the 1990s compared to the 2000s, when labor's share was declining, which is contrary to the hypothesis of capital generating relatively higher returns to labor. Thus, it appears that a shift of the returns to stadium capital is not able to explain the decline in the players' share of revenue. 8 Figure 6 . Returns of MLB Stadiums by Age (1990 Age ( -2015 ii.
Returns to 1990-1993 1996-1999 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015 In 2000, MLB created MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM) to manage online activities that included ticket sales and broadcasting. In 2003, its MLB.tv began selling stand-alone broadcast packages that allowed fans to watch MLB games over the internet enabling consumption by a larger fanbase. MLBAM has since partnered with other sports leagues and media companies to manage online operations and video streaming. Knowing MLBAM's contribution is difficult because it is a privately-held company; however, in 2017, MLBAM sold a 75-percent share of its streaming subsidiary BAMTech to Disney for $2.58 billion, indicating its strong revenue-generating capability (Barnes and Koblin 2017) .
The MLBAM venture increased league revenue by expanding the distribution of its same labor product more widely to garner uncaptured revenue. In addition, the revenue is shared equally across teams; therefore, teams cannot increase revenue through this channel by improving the individual team product. Though the returns to winning remain positive and increasing, the marginal contribution of labor to MLBAM revenues is small and thus a decline in labor's share of income is to be expected. The gains do not result from an increased marginal revenue product of players, and therefore this revenue should not be expected to flow to players in wages. This explanation is also consistent with the estimates of the returns to winning in Figure 2 that show decreased returns to winning after 2003, when MLBAM became a successful financial venture.
This hypothesis is similar to the superstar firm hypothesis that technological changes have allowed for the concentration of sales among firms with high productivity put forth by Autor et al. (2017) . The authors find that as industries became more concentrated in the US economy, labor's share declined. Further analysis indicates that industry concentration was likely a response to increased productivity, and that a declining labor share is expected due to decreased value-added from labor from these more-profitable firms. Thus, MLB's perfect concentration is further enhanced by capital flowing to the technology-enhanced sector where value is added and instead of the player-labor sector.
Discussion and Conclusion
Labor's share of income in baseball has been declining since the early 21st century in a manner consistent with the decline observed in US industries in aggregate. This study examines hypothetical explanations for the observed economy-wide phenomenon using baseball's labor market. The analysis indicates that competition for labor from substitute labor inputs (foreign workers) and capital (stadiums) have not played a large role in the decline of players' share of income. However, changes in the returns to winning, which are heavily influenced by collective bargaining with the players' union appear to be correlated with changes in labor's share of income in MLB. This may indicate a role for unions in determining labor's share in economy that has not been previously identified; however, the comparison should be made cautiously given the bilateral monopoly structure of MLB that is unique to professional sports and applicable to few other industries.
The estimates reveal that collectively-bargained rules for operation influence labor's share of revenue in MLB;
however, this influence is not necessarily the result of a bargaining game that transfers rents between parties.
CBA influence is connected to its influence on the returns to wins. Thus, revenue sharing rules with perverse incentives that punish winning and reward losing may induce teams to pay players less due to reduced marginal revenue products and thus reducing player's share of revenue.
Furthermore, the success of MLB's online media venture MLBAM provided a new revenue stream that was equally shared across teams and did not increase player's marginal revenue products. Thus, player wages should not be expected to grow with this revenue stream and thus the decline in players' share of income is expected. Thus, while collectively-bargained revenue-sharing rules may have contributed to the decline of the players' revenue share, the rise in the returns of a non-labor sector were also a product of the change in the revenue-structure of the industry.
This study also highlights the importance of unique characteristics of industries in determining labor's share, and gives credence to the notion that the relative stability of the US labor share in the past was partly a result of fluctuations across individual industries cancelling each other out in aggregate. The decline in labor's revenue share in MLB is consistent with changes in revenue share in the hospitality and leisure industry that experienced a decrease in labor's share of income from 65.7 percent to 62.1 percent between 1987 and 2011 (Elsby, Hobijn, and Şahin 2013) . Studies of labor's share by industry may provide further insight the determinants of the decline of aggregate labor's share in the US and other economies. 
